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Abstract: The outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 disease has led to significant loss of poultry 
and wild life and case fatality rates in humans of 60%. Wild birds are natural hosts for all avian influenza virus subtypes 
and over120 bird species have been reported with evidence of H5N1 infection. Influenza A viruses possess a segmented 
RNA genome and are characterized by frequently occurring genetic reassortment events, which play a very important role 
in virus evolution and the spread of novel gene constellations in immunologically naïve human and animal populations. 
Phylogenetic analysis of whole genome or sub-genomic sequences is a standard means for delineating genetic variation, 
novel reassortment events, and surveillance to trace the global transmission pathways. In this paper, special emphasis is 
given to the transmission and circulation of H5N1 among wild life populations, and to the reassortment events that are 
associated with inter-host transmission of the H5N1 viruses when they infect different hosts, such as birds, pigs and 
humans. In addition, we review the inter-subtype reassortment of the viral segments encoding inner proteins between the 
H5N1 viruses and viruses of other subtypes, such as H9N2 and H6N1. Finally, we highlight the usefulness of genomic 
sequences in molecular epidemiological analysis of HPAI H5N1 and the technical limitations in existing analytical 
methods that hinder them from playing a greater role in virological research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  A highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 virus 
was firstly isolated from Guangdong, China in 1996 [1]. In 
the intervening years, HPAI has resulted in disease outbreaks 
in over 63 countries across Asia, Europe and Africa and 
ongoing laboratory surveillance has detected its circulation 
in 9 countries in 2011 (http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-
in-the-world/update-on-avian-influenza/2010/). Wild birds 
are considered as natural hosts for all subtypes of avian 
influenza (AI) viruses [2-4]. HPAI H5N1 virus has been 
identified from over 120 wild bird species in nearly 30 
countries (http://www.birdlife.org/). More importantly, it has 
caused a total of 553 confirmed cases of human infection, 
323 people of whom died (http://www.who.int/csr/ 
disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2011_04_21/en
/index.html). It has also been isolated from other mammals, 
such as pigs, tigers, leopards, civets, cats, dogs, stone 
martens, pikas and donkeys. Therefore, it poses a serious 
threat to poultry industry, wild bird conservation and global 
public health. 
  The genome of H5N1 virus is composed of eight 
segmented RNA fragments of negative sense [5]. The first 
three segments encode viral polymerase basic proteins PB2,  
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PB1 and PA respectively. The fourth viral segment encodes 
hemagglutinin (HA), which is an important surface 
glycoprotein and the major antigen of the virus. HA is 
responsible for attaching the virions to the host sialic acid 
receptors on respiratory epithelia and is a critical determinant 
of pathogenicity. Nucleoprotein (NP), encoded by the fifth 
segment, binds to and encapsidates viral RNA in the infected 
cell nucleus. The sixth segment encodes another important 
surface-exposed glycoprotein, neuraminidase (NA). The 
major role of this protein is to release newly produced viral 
particles by cleaving sialic acid residues on host cells 
facilitating further infection. Mutations in the NA segment 
(eg: H275Y) are also associated with decreased antiviral 
susceptibility to the NA inhibitor drug class (oseltamivir, 
zanamivir). The seventh viral segment encodes two different 
proteins M1 and M2 by using alternative reading frames and 
the adamantane class of drugs target this proton channel in 
the virus surface. The final viral segment encodes two 
nonstructural proteins NS1 and NS2 due to alternatively 
splicing events. 
  If a single host is infected by two different subtypes of AI 
virus, it is possible that newly assembled viral particles will 
be created from segments whose origin is mixed, some 
coming from one subtype and some coming from another. 
This genetic reassortment plays a vital role in the origin of 
newly emerging pathogens of humans and animals as 
evidenced by the recent emergence of the swine-origin 
influenza A (H1N1) 2009 virus [6]. Phylogenetic analysis of 
viral sequences is a standard way to study the genetic Prospective of Genomics in Revealing Transmission, Reassortment  Current Genomics, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 7    467 
reassortment by comparing different phylogenetic trees 
constructed using all eight genomic segments. Previous 
studies have identified many genetic reassortment events in 
the HPAI H5N1 viruses [7-9]. 
  With recent advances in sequencing technology and the 
associated decrease in cost, more and more virologists use 
sequencing for epidemiological purposes [10-12]. AI 
sequences data resources, such as the NCBI Influenza Virus 
Resource (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/genomes/FLU/FLU. 
html) [13] and the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza 
Data (GISAID; http://platform.gisaid.org/) database [14], 
have provided the data platform for the storage and 
distribution of viral genomic information within the 
scientific community [12]. Phylogenetic analysis has played 
a more and more important role in epidemiological studies of 
AI viruses. Analyses based on partial genomic segments, 
predominantly based on the major epitopes HA and NA, or 
the whole genome sequences have provoked a reassessment 
of the origins, global circulation patterns, reassortment and 
evolution of the AI viruses [7-9,15]. This has led to profound 
insight into the global patterns of circulation of the viruses 
and improved global health protection strategies based on the 
interruption of transmission [12]. 
  In this paper, we have reviewed the role of viral genome 
sequences in revealing the mechanisms of the widespread 
and circulation of H5N1 viruses among wild life 
populations. We also reviewed the inter-host transmission 
and inter-subtype reassortment of H5N1 viruses. Finally, we 
have highlighted the technical limitations in existing 
analytical methods that hinder genomic sequences from 
playing a greater role in virological research and the 
usefulness of genomic sequences in molecular 
epidemiological analysis of HPAI H5N1. 
1. GENOMIC SEQUENCES IN TRACING THE 
SOURCE AND UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF 
WILD BIRDS IN THE H5N1 SPREAD 
  The United Nations Food and Argiculture Organisation 
(FAO) has established recommendations for the 
nomenclature for clade determination and genotyping by 
phylogenetic analysis based on the viral HA gene, e.g. Clade 
2.2, clade 2.3, etc [16]. Vijaykrishna and colleagues (2008) 
addressed the evolutionary dynamics of HPAI H5N1 viruses 
through the estimation of divergence times of gene segments 
of major reassortants and population dynamics analyses of 
the viruses in poultry [17]. Thirteen different nodes were 
identified, eg. I: Gs/GD, II: X-series, III: Clades 1, 2, 8, 9; 
IV: Clade 1; V: Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia (VTM)+ 
precursor; VI: VTM; VII: Indonesia+precursor; VIII: Clade 
2.1 (Indonesia); IX: Clade 2.2 (Qinghai lineage); X: Clade 
2.3; XI: Clades 2.3.1, 2.3.2; XII: Clades 2.3.3, 2.3.4; XIII: 
Clade 2.3.4 (Fujian-like). 
  The prototype virus of HPAI H5N1 virus was isolated 
from Guangdong, China in 1996 [1] and was responsible for 
the influenza outbreak in Hong Kong Special Autonomous 
Region (SAR) in 1997 [15]. HPAI H5N1 gradually became 
established among poultry in different regions of China and 
developed into several phylogenetically different lineages or 
genotypes [7-9]. In late 2003 and early 2004, infections 
caused by HPAI H5N1 viruses were reported in several 
neighboring Asian countries (http://www.who.int/csr/ 
disease/avian_influenza/ai_timeline/en/index.html). In May 
2005, H5N1 virus caused an outbreak in migratory 
waterfowl in Qinghai Lake, western China [18, 19]. 
Subsequently, H5N1 influenza outbreaks were reported in 
Xinjiang Uygur and Tibet Autonomous regions of China, 
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Siberia of Russia, Turkey, Romania, 
Croatia, the United Kingdom and Ukraine in 2005. In 2006, 
more European countries reported HPAI H5N1 outbreaks in 
poultries and wild birds and in February 2006, the first 
outbreak of HPAI H5N1 virus in Africa was reported in 
Nigeria (http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/ 
ai_timeline/en/index.html). Reid and co-workers (2010) 
reported the first incursion of HPAI H5N1 viruses of clade 
2.3.2 into European poultry that infected Romanian domestic 
poultry and Bulgarian wild birds, which represented the most 
westerly spread of clade 2.3.2 viruses identified to date [20]. 
So far, HPAI H5N1 virus has caused outbreaks in more than 
63 countries of Eurasia and Africa since 2003 and circulation 
is ongoing in 2011 (http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_ 
influenza/ai_timeline/en/index.html). 
  Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain the 
rapid spread of HPAI H5N1 viruses in Eurasia and Africa, 
two of which are the poultry transmission model [21] and the 
bird migration model [22, 23]. Gautheir-Clerc et al. (2007) 
suggested that human movement of domestic poultry was the 
main agent of global dispersal of the virus into Africa and 
Europe [21]. Phylogenetic studies also supported that clade 
2.3.2 viruses established in Vietnam and southern China in 
2004 and advanced northwards along poultry trading routes 
[24]. In addition, the introduction of the HPAI H5N1 viruses 
into Nigeria was also found to be associated with the legal 
and/or illegal poultry trade [25]. 
  The bird migration model is favored by most reports as 
wild birds are considered natural hosts for low pathogenic AI 
viruses and they harbor all subtypes of AI viruses [2-4]. 
Apart from phylogenetic analysis, this mode of transmission 
has also been supported by findings obtained using other 
independent techniques. For example, results from satellite 
tracking and remote sensing related the outbreaks of HPAI 
H5N1 to migratory birds [26, 27]. A space-time cluster 
analysis also showed that the spread of HPAI H5N1 viruses 
and bird migratory routes correlated well [28]. Nonetheless, 
this view is still controversial [29-31] and a few studies have 
given opposing results which do not support this mechanism 
of HPAI transmission [32]. 
  Phylogenetic analysis of the viral genome sequences has 
provided a lot of evidence that wild birds are implicated in 
the spread of HPAI H5N1 viruses from southern China to 
Africa along the migratory flyways. For example, the 
sequences of the Qinghai Lake isolates from 2005 have been 
traced to one migratory duck isolate from Poyang Lake, 
Jiangxi Province [33]. The movement of clade 2.2.2 between 
Lhasa in Tibet and Qinghai was consistent with the 
migration route of bar-headed geese along the Central Asian 
flyway [27,34]. The introduction of the HPAI H5N1 virus 
from Qinghai Lake to western Siberia was suggested to be 
caused by migratory birds revealed by the viral genomic 
sequencing analysis [35]. The virus spread from Russia to 
the Black Sea demonstrated a significant correlation with the 
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analysis showed that the HPAI H5N1 outbreak in Sweden in 
2006 was also associated with the long distance migration of 
the wild birds [37]. That full genome comparison of the 
African AI cases and other earlier worldwide isolates 
demonstrated a high genetic similarity also indicated the 
circulation within Africa through migratory birds’ migration 
[38].  
  Based on the bird migration model, water birds such as 
the great-crested grebe (Podiceps cristatus), tufted duck 
(Aythya fuligula), whooper swan (Cygnus cygnus) and black-
headed gull (Chroicocephalus ridibundus) appear to be key 
to the widespread dissemination of subclade 2.3.2 viruses, 
and the bar-headed goose and ruddy shelduck, two migratory 
hosts for HPAI H5N1 along the Central Asia Flyway, 
emerged as potential vectors for the movement of clade 2.2.1 
and clade 2.2.2 viruses (Newman et al. unpubl.). The bar-
headed goose isolates from this outbreak were found sharing 
PB2 genes common to HPAI H5N1 circulating in live bird 
markets in Tibet [39]. 
2. A CASE STUDY: HPAI H5N1 VIRUSES FROM THE 
QINGHAI LAKE 
  From the first H5N1 outbreak among waterfowl 
populations in 2005 at Qinghai Lake, four isolates were 
sequenced. Phylogenetic analysis showed that five of the 
eight genomic segments (M, PA, PB1, PB2, and NS) were 
closely related to a Hong Kong isolate (A/peregrine 
falcon/HK/D0028/04). This suggested that the viruses might 
be created from reassortants that originated in birds over-
wintering in Southeast Asia [19]. Another independent study 
showed that the HA and NA genes of the Qinghai isolates 
and other H5N1 viruses from poultry in Fujian, Guangdong, 
Hunan and Yunnan provinces from 2005 were similar to the 
H5N1 virus A/Chicken/Shantou/4231/2003, while the 
internal genes were closely related to H5N1 viruses from 
poultry described in southern China during 2005 (e.g. 
A/Chicken/Shantou/810/2005). This indicates that the 
viruses might be transmitted to Qinghai Lake from poultry in 
southern China via a single introduction [18]. 
  After the 2005 out break, Kilpatrick et al. (2006) 
integrated phylogenetic relationships of the identified viral 
sequences, migratory bird movements, trade in poultry and 
wild birds to determine the pathway of the introduction 
events, and found that an important factor was the synergistic 
spread of H5N1 by poultry and wild birds [40]. Based on 
this, Kilpatrick et al. (2006) suggested that the most effective 
strategy to prevent H5N1 from cross hemisphere circulation 
would be even stricter controls or outright bans on illegal 
trade of poultry and wild birds [40]. 
  In 2006, three viruses (BHGs/QH/F/06; GBHGull/ 
QH/3/06; Swan/QH/01/06) were isolated from three different 
wild bird species (bar-headed goose, great brown-headed 
gull and whooper swan) respectively from Qinghai Lake. 
Results from both phylogenetic analysis of these viruses and 
the hosts’ ecology suggested that these H5N1 viruses may be 
transported across different host species and spread into or 
out of Qinghai Lake through their migration [41]. 
  Why did H5N1 viruses re-emerge in 2006 in Qinghai? 
Were these viruses transmitted from outside or did they re-
emerge from a local niche? To answer these questions, Wang 
et al. (2008) conducted further phylogenetic analyses of the 
H5N1 viruses isolated from this region in both 2005 and 
2006. Their results suggested that the Qinghai AI viruses 
from 2006 (QH06) most probably came from the flyway of 
migratory birds other than directly from the Qinghai cases 
from 2005 (QH05) [42]. They speculated that the AI QH05 
strain may travel across the flyways spreading into Russia, 
and then transfer to the Mediterranean and European regions, 
then back to Qinghai Lake through wild bird migration. 
Genetic drift over the intervening year gave rise to the QH06 
reintroduction in 2006. 
  Importantly, H5N1 viruses were also detected and 
genetically characterized from Qinghai Province in 2007 and 
demonstrated that two sequences were found more closely 
related to H5N1 viruses from Egypt, Togo, Ghana, and 
Nigeria in 2007. Therefore, migratory birds serving as 
vectors were the most parsimonious explanation for 
disseminating H5N1 strains via  their overlapping flyways 
[39]. 
  No viruses were isolated in 2008 in Qinghai Lake, but in 
both 2009 and 2010, H5N1 viruses were again described in 
the Qinghai aquatic wildfowl. Phylogenetic analysis of the 
HA sequences revealed that they were most closely related to 
clade 2.3.2 viruses from wild birds in Hong Kong and Japan 
during 2007-2008 [43]. This suggested that the 2009 and 
2010 Qinghai strains were different from the QH05 virus of 
clade 2.2 [43]. They were also found closely related to those 
identified from Mongolia and Uvs Nuur Lake in 2009 [43-
45]. Once again, this indicated that most viruses in the 
Qinghai Lake region might be transmitted by wild birds 
along the migration flyway [45]. 
  The HPAI viruses described during 2009 and 2010 
belonged to clade 2.3.2 and the HA cleavage site in these 
viruses was PQRERRRKRG, however in clade 2.2, an 
addition of a lysine residue (and consequent increase in 
charge) was described: PQRERRRKKRG [43,45]. The NA 
genes of the 2009 and 2010 isolates had a deletion of 20 
amino acids at residues 49-68 in the stalk region. None of the 
detected amino acid substitutions in NA proteins were 
previously known to be associated with conferring decreased 
susceptibility to the adamantane or NAI class of anti-virals. 
Unlike past Qinghai Lake strains of clade 2.2, the Qinghai 
H5N1 strains from 2009 did not have an E627K substitution 
in the PB1 protein and furthermore the NS1 had a deletion of 
5 amino acids at residues 80-84, which was commonly 
observed in HPAI H5N1 viruses that were circulating in 
Southeast Asia [43]. 
  This review of the H5N1 viruses in wild birds described 
to date at Qinghai Lake suggests that they were mostly 
circulated by wild birds through the Central Asian flyway, 
and that HPAI pathotypes still exist at the lake and are still 
undergoing evolution.  
3. INTER-HOST TRANSMISSION OF HPAI H5N1 
3.1. Transmission of HPAI H5N1 to Humans 
  In May 1997, an H5N1 virus was isolated from a 3-year-
old boy from Hong Kong SAR for the first time [46-48]. 
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countries, such as China [49-53], Vietnam [54, 55], Thailand 
[56, 57], Indonesia [58, 59], Cambodia, Turkey [60], 
Bangladesh [61] and Egypt [62, 63]. As of May 13, 2011, a 
total of 553 confirmed cases and 323 fatal cases of human 
infection with H5N1 have been reported worldwide 
(http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cas
es_table_2011_04_21/en/index.html).  
  Phylogenetic analysis of the genomic sequences of the 
human cases has been widely used to trace the origin and 
evolution of these HPAI pathotypes. The majority of the 
genomic sequences of the human H5N1 strains were 
reported to be derived from avian strains [47, 51, 56-58, 64-
67]. For example, the genomic sequences responsible for the 
first human infection with H5N1 were found to be all avian-
like [47, 64]. Although the human H5N1 isolates from Hong 
Kong SAR from 2002 were still of avian origin and they 
were closely related to the genotype Z and Z
+ viruses, their 
internal proteins had a different origin with the H5N1 viruses 
that caused the first known case of human infection in Hong 
Kong in 1997 [65]. Phylogenetic analyses have also shown 
that all the eight segments of the human H5N1 strains from 
Thailand, Indonesia and other Asian countries from 2004 
and 2005 were closely related to the avian isolates of 
genotype Z [56, 58, 66]. Therefore, human infection with 
H5N1 virus is most likely to be associated with direct or 
indirect contact with infected birds or wildfowl [60, 68, 69], 
although the possibilities of inter-personal transmission of 
HPAI H5N1 and environment-to-human transmission still 
exist [57, 58, 67, 69, 70]. 
  Genetic analysis of specific amino acid mutations in the 
viral genome has also provided insight into the evolution and 
variation associated with the host-shift, drug-resistance and 
virulence of the viruses. For instance, the first HPAI H5N1 
isolate from human from Hong Kong in 1997 possessed the 
RERRRKK motif at the basic cleavage site of the HA 
protein, which is considered a sign of HPAI viruses [71]. 
The first drug-resistant H5N1 virus whose NA protein had a 
histidine-to-tyrosine substitution at position 275 (N1 
numbering) was isolated from a Vietnamese girl in 2005 [72] 
and this mutation has been reported to confer resistance to 
oseltamivir [73,74]. In particular, it was reported that this 
mutation emerged during the anti-viral treatment [75]. 
Viruses with the S294N mutation in the NA protein were 
isolated from humans from Egypt in late 2006 [76] and this 
amino acid substitution has been reported to reduce the 
susceptibility of the viruses to oseltamivir [72]. Similarly, 
viruses with the S31N mutation in the M2 protein, which is 
associated with amantadine resistance [77], have been 
isolated from humans from Hong Kong [65]. The D627K 
amino acid substitution in the PB2 protein was reported to 
increase the virulence of H5N1 viruses in mice [78, 79] and 
it has been observed in some human strains from Thailand 
[56] and Egypt [63]. More recently, it was also reported that 
a single mutation at position 192 or a double mutation at 
positions 129 and 151 of the HA protein could have 
increased the human-type receptor specificity of HPAI 
viruses that newly emerged in birds in Egypt [80]. 
3.2. Transmission of HPAI H5N1 to Pigs 
  Pigs have receptors that correspond to the AI-specific -
2,3-NeuAcGal sialic acid linkage and human influenza-
specific  -2,6-NeuAcGal sialic acid linkage [81,82]. 
Therefore, they are regarded as a potential “mixing vessel” 
for avian and human influenza and the main intermediate 
host for AI viruses to make the appropriate genetic changes 
in order to infect humans [83-85]. However, there was no 
evidence that pigs had transmitted wholly AI viruses of 
H5N1 and other subtypes to humans [86]. It is reported that 
the susceptibility of domestic pigs to HPAI H5N1 is low [87] 
and the HPAI H5N1 viruses are not transmitted among pigs 
under experimental conditions [88]. A field study showed 
that no sera positive for H5 was detected in samples 
collected from Fujian Province, China in 2004 and 2007 
[89]. In addition, the swine H5N1 isolates were less virulent 
to mice than avian isolates [90].  
  However, HPAI H5N1 has been isolated from pigs from 
China [91-93] and Indonesia [94]. Genetic analysis showed 
that the RNA segments of the swine isolates all came from 
avian isolates. A Bayesian phylogenetic analysis of a 
Chinese swine isolate revealed that it was a multiple 
reassortant, with its gene segments coming from avian 
H5N1, H9N2 and influenza viruses of other unknown 
subtype [92]. In Indonesia, multiple introduction events of 
the viruses from avian hosts to pigs have also been described 
[94]. 
3.3. Transmission of HPAI H5N1 to other Mammals 
  HPAI H5N1 has been also reported to infect other 
mammals apart from humans and pigs. These hosts include 
tiger [95-97], leopard [95], domestic cat [98-101], civet 
[102], dog [103-105], stone marten [106], pika [107] and 
donkey [108]. Phylogenetic analysis of the viral genome 
sequences has also been used to trace the origin of these 
viruses. For example, the H5N1 virus responsible for the cat 
infection was circulating among avian hosts in Thailand in 
early 2004 [98]. Phylogenetic analysis of the full genome 
sequence of the virus from civet revealed that it was closely 
related to HPAI H5N1 viruses of genotype G [102]. 
Similarly, the dog that died of HPAI H5N1 infection was 
also infected by viruses circulating in Thailand 
contemporaneously [104]. Therefore, most of these viruses 
in non-avian species were closely related to the AI isolates 
circulating in the region at the same time. However, a 
notable exception was that viruses from Raccoon Dogs from 
China were of genotype V, which was not the dominant 
genotype in China at that time [105].  
4. INTER-SUBTYPE REASSORTMENT OF HPAI 
H5N1 
  Inter-subtype reassortment also plays an important role in 
the evolution and variation of HPAI H5N1 and has been 
frequently detected. It was reported that the internal genes of 
the HPAI H5N1 viruses in Hong Kong in 1997 were 
obtained from viruses of H9N2 subtype via  inter-subtype 
reassortment [15]. Phylogenetic analysis of the eight separate 
segments has identified many H5N1 genotypes since 1996, 
such as A, B, C, D, E [7], V, W, X0-X3, Y, Z, Z
+ [8], G [9]. 
Among them, the prototype HPAI H5N1 virus, Gs/GD/1/96 
[1], reassorted with viruses of one or more unknown 
subtypes gave rise to genotypes A, B and C in 2000 [7, 8]. 
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Dk/HK/Y280/97-like virus (H9N2 subtype) [7, 8]. The NP 
gene of genotype E virus came from viruses of an unknown 
subtype [7, 8]. Reassortment between genotype E and other 
aquatic AI viruses created genotypes X0-X3, whose PB2, PA 
and NS genes were not of H5N1 subtype [8]. Genotypes V, 
W, Y, Z and Z
+ were also inter-subtype reassortants with 
some of the internal genes coming from aquatic AI viruses of 
other subtypes [8]. In addition, there are some genotypes that 
have been reported but not nominated. For example, viruses 
isolated from tree sparrows from Henan Province, China in 
2004 belonged to a novel genotype [109]. Phylogenetic 
analysis revealed that they were created by inter-subtype 
reassortment between genotype A and AI viruses of other 
subtype. 
  In a few cases, inter-subtype reassortment and inter-host 
transmission occur together and create novel reassortants. In 
2003, a HPAI H5N1 virus was isolated from pigs from 
Shandong Province, China. Phylogenetic analysis revealed 
that the M and NS gene came from H9N2 subtype and the 
PB1, PA and NP gene came from AI viruses of other 
subtypes [92]. 
5. TECHNICAL LIMITATIONS IN CURRENT 
ANALYTICAL METHODS 
  Phylogenetic analysis of viral sequences is a standard 
way to help delineate the molecular epidemiology of 
outbreak events, including those involving HPAI H5N1 
viruses. However, the large numbers of sequences that are 
analyzed can sometimes cause particular problems. As of 
May 16
th, 2011, there have been 602 virus genomes, 3,586 
HA genes and 2,629 NA genes of H5N1 subtype available in 
GenBank [13]. With recent advances in sequencing 
technology, decreases in sequencing cost and the increased 
use of sequencing for epidemiological purposes, these 
datasets will become increasingly large. In this case, a 
traditional phylogenetic analysis becomes extremely difficult 
due to computational demands or problems with 
visualization of the outputs. Although there have been fast 
and paralleled algorithms to construct phylogenetic trees, 
such as PhyML [110] and RaxML [111], it is still hard to 
analyze a tree derived from a large dataset. 
  Proteotyping has been proposed to study the evolution of 
type A influenza [112, 113]. Proteotying is similar to 
genotyping at the DNA level and is able to capture the amino 
acid variations of the viruses [112,113]. It was used to 
analyze 2,196 AI virus genes and 169 complete virus 
genomes [112]. However, due to lack of computer programs 
to facilitate the proteotyping process and lack of appropriate 
standard to define proteotypes, this method has not been 
widely accepted by virologists thus far. 
  An alternative approach to phylogenetic analysis is to 
carry out “ordination” using a dimension reduction technique 
such as multidimensional scaling (MDS) [114], which is able 
to deal with very large numbers of sequences in a short 
period of time. MDS has been used to visualize antigenic 
variation in human influenza A, subtype H3N2 viruses [115]. 
Principal co-ordinates analysis (PCOORD) is equivalent to 
MDS when the distances are Euclidean. PCOORD has been 
used by us [85] to study the phylogenetic diversity of 
influenza A viruses and the accompanying software has also 
been used to analyze HBV and HCV sequence variation 
[116]. However, although PCOORD and other MDS 
techniques can yield information on the major groupings 
(similar to lineages for a phylogenetic tree) of the sequences 
and can analyze a large number of sequences, they fail to 
reveal ancestor-descendant relationship which can be easily 
seen from the phylogenetic tree. 
  Therefore, none of the methods currently available is 
suitable to analyze a large number of viral sequences. This 
has been proven to be problematical not only in the 
molecular epidemiology of influenza, but also in HIV, HBV, 
HCV and measles for example where there have been 
thousands of sequences available. To resolve this problem, 
novel mathematical techniques should be introduced and 
better computer programs should be developed. 
  In addition, several online or stand-alone computer 
programs have been developed to facilitate the genotyping 
and identification of reassortant influenza viruses [117-121]. 
Among them, FluGenome [117], the method proposed by 
Suzuki (2010) [119], GiRaF [120] and FluReF [121] are 
based on phylogenetic trees but employ different methods to 
determine the topological differences among the trees 
constructed using each genomic segment, while the 
quantitative genotyping algorithm developed by Wan et al. 
(2007) is not phylogeny-based [118]. Although these 
methods are robust and efficient, they are not extensively 
applied to date for the following reasons. Firstly, phylogeny-
based programs are often time-consuming requiring 
computing power and therefore cannot deal with large 
datasets, although GiRaF is reported to be able to perform a 
large-scale analysis [120]. Secondly, although these methods 
generate consistent outputs, the results from each of them are 
not directly comparable and are therefore difficult to 
compare. For example, the authors of FluGenome analyzed 
ca. 2300 complete genomes of type A influenza and 
identified 156 unique genotypes [117]. However, Wan et al. 
(2007) identified 107 niches among only 283 complete 
genomes of H5N1 AI viruses [118]. In addition, GiRaF was 
also used to analyze 1101 whole-genome sequences of non-
human H5N1 influenza viruses and identified 18 
reassortment events [120]. Therefore, results obtained using 
these programs are not always consistent and this makes the 
explanation of the results more complicated. Lastly, the 
widely accepted nomenclature system for HPAI H5N1 is not 
employed by any of these computer programs. 
6. FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR USING THE 
GENOMICS 
  Recent large-scale genome sequencing of HPAI H5N1 
viruses, antigenic typing and database information mining 
have significantly improved the study of HPAI virus origin, 
diversity, transmission, reassortment and evolution. Future in 
depth studies of the influenza reservoir, along with large-
scale data mining of genomic resources and the integration 
of epidemiological, genomic, and antigenic data, should 
enhance our understanding of antigenic drift and improve the 
detection and control of the emerging novel strains [12]. 
  Genomic tools, such as high-throughput sequencing, viral 
and host mRNA and microRNA expression profiling, and 
microarray-based analysis of pathogen and host single Prospective of Genomics in Revealing Transmission, Reassortment  Current Genomics, 2011, Vol. 12, No. 7    471 
nucleotide polymorphisms will prove to be important 
methods not only in revealing the patterns of circulation but 
also the mechanisms of the pathogenesis of HPAI H5N1 
viruses among wildlife populations. Furthermore, these 
innovative new technologies may also help to identify the 
leads for therapeutic intervention, and to predict the new 
emergence of novel genotype/pathotypes with altered 
virulence and most importantly aid the development of 
effective vaccines [11]. 
  To sum up, rapid identification of newly emerging 
viruses through the use of genomics tools is one of the major 
challenges in the near future. Phylogenomic and 
phylogeographic approaches combined with host-vector 
diversity, behavior and ecology will be more effective tools 
in tracing the origin, transmission, reassortment and 
evolution of the HPAI H5N1 viruses. 
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